Power in Uniform: Why Plateau’s Policing Debate Misses the Point

By Fwangmun Oscar Danladi

I am no expert in security affairs or the legal frameworks surrounding state polic[e](ing). However, I write as a researcher, community mobilizer, and an optimist—one who still believes in the possibilities hidden within the seeming impossibilities of a reimagined Nigeria. Coming from the Middle Belt, a region long marked by contention yet overflowing with untapped potential, I feel compelled to reflect on an issue that continues to shape our collective experience: insecurity. While this challenge is not peculiar to Plateau State or the wider North-Central region, its historical and social peculiarities give it a unique texture. It is against this backdrop that I offer my thoughts on the ongoing debate around state policing—a conversation that, though long overdue, demands a more grounded and nuanced engagement beyond partisan sentiments.

Overview of the State Police Debate in Plateau State

The issue of creating state police has sparked a heated debate in Plateau State, North-Central Nigeria. In recent weeks, Plateau’s Governor Caleb Mutfwang has renewed calls for a state police force as a solution to escalating violence, arguing that a centralised command from Abuja is no longer sufficient for local threats (Gazette, 2025). He points out that attackers often infiltrate Plateau from neighboring states (such as Taraba or Kaduna) to strike rural villages and then retreat, which federal forces cannot effectively monitor from afar. To bolster grassroots security, Governor Mutfwang’s administration has already begun strengthening “Operation Rainbow,” a community-based vigilante initiative, recruiting over 1,450 local operatives to help protect communities. While advocating state police, Mutfwang acknowledges fears of political abuse but insists that adequate safeguards and oversight could prevent misuse, noting that other federations (like the U.S.) successfully run multi-layered policing systems. In his view, Nigeria can make state policing work if the political will is there, and it could greatly improve response times and tailor security to local needs. On the other side of the debate, Representative Yusuf Gagdi, who represents Pankshin/Kanke/Kanam in the House of Representatives, has vocally opposed the creation of state police. In late September 2025, after a deadly bandit attack in Kanam LGA, Mr. Gagdi met with constituents and reiterated his rejection of state police, directly countering Governor Mutfwang’s proposal (Ripples Nigeria, 2025). Speaking both to his constituents and later in media interviews, the lawmaker warned that state governors would likely misuse state police forces as political tools rather than for public safety (Premium Times, 2025). “My position, even on the floor of the House, is that governors will misuse state police, particularly against political opponents,” Mr. Gagdi argues, fearing it “will not be used to maintain peace and order”. Instead, he

believes Nigeria is “not ripe” for adding new security agencies; the focus should be on strengthening and properly funding existing federal security organs – the police, military, State Security Service (SSS), etc. – with greater accountability.

Arguments Against State Police: Fears of Misuse and Political Oppression

Rep. Gagdi and like-minded critics ground their objections in Nigeria’s fraught political context. They contend that many state governors lack a track record of fairness and could weaponize state police against rivals. As evidence, Mr. Gagdi points to the conduct of local elections: virtually no opposition candidates win local government council seats under any state governor’s watch, due to manipulation of the process (Ripples Nigeria, 2025). He argues that if governors cannot even run impartial local elections (often using state electoral commissions to wipe out opposition), it would be dangerous to entrust them with armed police forces under their direct control (Ripples Nigeria, 2025). In Gagdi’s view, giving a governor command of officers bearing AK-47 rifles could invite grave abuses: “If they cannot handle a state independent electoral commission fairly… how do you then give them state police?” he challenges (Ripples Nigeria, 2025). The Inspector-General of Police, Kayode Egbetokun, has echoed this concern, stating that Nigeria is not yet “mature” enough for state policing and warning of the “potential for abuse of power by the state political leadership” (Premium Times, 2025). The IGP cautions that state governors could subvert security forces for personal or political gain, undermining human rights and even creating jurisdictional conflicts between state and federal authorities (Premium Times, 2025).

Beyond individual lawmakers, broader political groups have also voiced opposition. For example, the North-Central APC Forum – a coalition of ruling-party stakeholders in the region – has formally urged President Tinubu and the National Assembly to reject proposals for state police, describing it as a “dangerous path” (Vanguard, 2025). The Forum warns that state-controlled police could be misused by state authorities, potentially deepening the marginalization of minority ethnic or religious groups and increasing political repression in some states (Vanguard, 2025). In a religiously diverse region like the North-Central, they caution, a state police outfit in the wrong hands could unfairly target minority communities or dissenting voices (Vanguard, 2025). Opponents also raise the specter of threatening national unity – fearing that dozens of politicized state forces might undermine democracy, criminalize dissent, and even lead to anarchy or fragmentation if rival governors turn security forces against each other or against federal control (Vanguard, 2025).

It is notable that Rep. Gagdi distinguishes between “state police” and “state policing.” He says he supports the latter – meaning localized security efforts – but not the formal establishment of a new state-run police force (Ripples Nigeria, 2025). In a radio programme in Jos, Mr. Gagdi clarified that he backs community policing initiatives, whereby local youths are recruited into vigilante groups to protect their communities, since these locals “know the terrain better” (Ripples Nigeria, 2025). Such community

vigilante corps, he argues, would be answerable to their communities rather than a governor, and thus presumably less prone to political misuse (Ripples Nigeria, 2025). This perspective reflects an attempt to address insecurity at the grassroots level without creating a formal state police structure that could be hijacked by politicians. Essentially, Gagdi and similar critics favor bolstering local security through informal or auxiliary means, under the supervision of existing federal agencies or community leaders, instead of empowering state governments with independent police forces.

Arguments For State Police: Local Security and Responsiveness

Proponents of state police, including Governor Mutfwang and many other Nigerian leaders, emphasize the urgent security needs of local communities and the limitations of the current centralized policing model. Over the last decade, Nigeria has been gripped by a wave of violence – terrorism, banditry, kidnappings, rural militancy, and deadly herder-farmer clashes – which federal police have struggled to contain (Premium Times, 2025). With barely one federal policeman per 400+ citizens and many hard-to-reach areas, response times to crises in states like Plateau are often painfully slow. Indeed, security statistics underscore the severity of the situation: between January and April 2025, northern Nigeria saw over 1,000 fatalities from terrorism, banditry and communal violence, a 49% increase from the same period the previous year (Nigeria Risk index, 2025). This spike, concentrated in states such as Sokoto, Zamfara, Borno – and with persistent attacks in Plateau as well – has turned the clamor for state police from a theoretical debate into what many describe as a national emergency (Nigeria Risk index, 2025).

Governor Mutfwang and other advocates argue that decentralizing the police is about survival, not politics (Nigeria Risk index, 2025). They assert that state and local authorities are best positioned to understand their terrain and security context, and thus need their own law enforcement apparatus that they can train, equip, and deploy rapidly. In Plateau’s case, Mutfwang notes that violent incursions often happen in remote villages at odd hours – the kind of threats that a locally commanded force could potentially respond to quicker than units taking orders from Abuja (Gazettengr, 2025). Law enforcement closer to the community could also foster better intelligence-gathering and trust. Proponents point out that officers who are locally recruited and based will naturally have stronger ties to the community and deeper understanding of local criminal networks or conflict flashpoints (Nigeria Risk index, 2025). This could enable more proactive and culturally informed policing strategies – whether dealing with cattle rustling unique to Middle Belt farming communities, or early-warning signs of ethno-religious clashes in sensitive areas (Nigeria Risk index, 2025).

Governor Mutfwang has tried to address the misuse concerns head-on. Acknowledging that critics “have fears about political misuse of state police,” he maintains that “adequate safeguards” can and must be built in (Gazettengr, 2025). Exactly what those

safeguards would be is the crux of the debate. Mutfwang suggests looking to models from other federations: many countries successfully operate multiple layers of policing – municipal, state, and federal – by clearly delineating their powers and oversight. The United States, for instance, has city police, state police (or sheriffs), and federal agencies co-existing; Nigeria’s own pre-independence era featured local police under regional authorities (Premium Times, 2025). With strong legal frameworks and oversight bodies, Nigeria could likewise implement state police without undermining national unity, Mutfwang argues (Gazettengr, 2025). He emphasizes that this is not an unprecedented idea – even Nigeria’s 2014 National Conference (a broad assembly of national stakeholders) overwhelmingly agreed on the need for state police, and recent national dialogues have seen bipartisan support, including from President Bola Tinubu and former President Goodluck Jonathan (Premium Times, 2025). In fact, President Tinubu in 2024 described state policing as a “milestone” for making law enforcement more “responsive to local needs” (Premium Times, 2025).

Supporters also stress that doing nothing is not a viable option. Communities are desperate for better protection, and many states have already resorted to self-help security measures. Virtually all 36 states today have some form of government-endorsed local security outfit – even though these are technically not full-fledged police. For example, the South-Western states formed the Amotekun corps in 2020; Lagos State created a Neighbourhood Safety Corps; Kano State runs a local vigilante Neighborhood Watch; Plateau State’s “Operation Rainbow” has been in place as a vigilante network; Benue State established a Volunteer Guards unit, and so on (Daily Trust, 2025). The proliferation of these outfits is a testament to the fact that local authorities feel compelled to fill the vacuum in security left by the overstretched federal police. Governor Mutfwang’s recent disclosure that Plateau has deployed surveillance drones and other innovations shows states are trying to innovate in security (Gazettengr, 2025). But these efforts remain patchworks without the formal legal backing and resources a state police would have. Proponents argue that formalizing and standardizing state-level policing could bring coherence, training, and accountability to what is already de facto happening on the ground under various names.

Grassroots Impact and Community Concerns

Amidst the political tug-of-war, there is a risk that the voices of ordinary citizens and the on-the-street realities get lost in the debate. For families living in fear of the next attack, the finer points of constitutional law or federal–state power dynamics are often secondary to a basic plea: security. As one displaced mother from Zamfara (another violence-torn state) bluntly put it, “What we want is safety. I don’t care who wears the uniform – just protect us.” (Nigeria Risk index, 2025). This heartfelt sentiment is likely shared by many in Plateau’s villages and urban neighborhoods alike. Whether protection comes from federal police, state police, or well-organized community

vigilantes, local residents simply need the violence to stop. In recent years, communities in Plateau State have suffered repeated mass killings, kidnappings, and displacement due to bandit raids and communal conflicts. In several cases, locals have complained of slow or insufficient response by centrally commanded security forces, which fuels the demand for closer-to-home solutions. The grassroots perspective thus injects a sense of urgency and pragmatism into the conversation: rather than ideology, what matters is what will save lives and restore peace in their streets and farms. However, leaving security to informal community vigilantes alone is a double-edged sword. While vigilante groups or “community policing” outfits can indeed know the terrain and respond quicker, they often operate without clear regulation or training, which has led to serious abuses. A recent investigation found that in just a three-month span, at least 68 civilians were killed by various vigilante groups across Nigeria, in incidents of alleged extrajudicial execution, torture, harassment or unlawful detention (Daily Trust, 2025). In one notorious case, vigilantes in Edo State mistakenly killed 16 innocent hunters traveling through a town, sparking national outrage (Daily Trust, 2025). Such incidents underscore a dilemma: who polices the community police? Many vigilante outfits are created under state or local laws, but there is no consistent national regulatory body supervising them (Daily Trust, 2025). Oversight is patchy, and accountability is often weak when abuses occur. Despite these problems, communities often tolerate or even welcome vigilantes because they provide some security presence where the federal institutions have failed to deliver (Daily Trust, 2025). In Borno State, for instance, the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) – a volunteer militia – became a critical ally in fighting Boko Haram, earning public gratitude for defending neighborhoods the army struggled to secure (Daily Trust, 2025). Likewise, in parts of the Middle Belt, local hunter associations or ethnic defense groups have stepped up to ward off attacks when people felt abandoned.

In Plateau State, Operation Rainbow is an example of this grassroots approach – a state-backed vigilante network integrating local volunteers to support conventional security agencies (Gazettengr, 2025). The Plateau government provides some training and stipends to these recruits, but they are lightly armed (if at all) and meant to gather intelligence and sound early warnings. Such initiatives reflect both the potential and the limitations of community-based security. On one hand, they empower locals to take charge of their own safety and can be more attuned to early signs of trouble. On the other hand, without the full authority and equipment of a formal police force, there is only so much they can do against well-armed criminal gangs – and there remains a risk of vigilantism veering into lawlessness. Community leaders in Plateau have expressed support for anything that improves security, but they also worry about accountability. Opinions among residents are divided: some see vigilantes as heroes filling a gap, others fear they might become just another source of intimidation if unchecked (Daily Trust, 2025).

The grassroots impact of the state policing debate thus cuts both ways. Ordinary people stand to benefit from more localized and responsive policing – whether through a state police or properly managed community policing – but they also stand to suffer if these forces are misused or unregulated. Unfortunately, in the current debate much of the focus has been on governors and politicians’ interests (either expanding their power or fearing their rival’s power) rather than on establishing a system that truly serves the people on the ground. Street-level concerns, like how quickly a victim can get help or how fairly an accused person will be treated, must be central in this discourse. Right now, those practical questions are often lost amid the political rhetoric and mutual distrust.

Toward a Nuanced, Multi-Layered Approach

Given the valid points raised by both sides, it is clear that Nigeria’s policing challenges require a nuanced, multi-layered solution rather than a one-dimensional yes-or-no answer. The debate should move beyond personal sentiments and political turf wars, and instead engage with how to achieve both improved security and accountability. Several steps and safeguards could be considered to strike this balance:

• Constitutional and Legal Safeguards: If state police are to be created, there must be robust legal frameworks to prevent abuse. For example, an independent State Police Service Commission in each state (with representation from opposition parties, civil society, and perhaps the federal police) could oversee recruitment, appointments, and discipline of officers to insulate the force from partisan control. Clear jurisdictional boundaries should be defined in the constitution to delineate state police duties versus federal police, reducing turf conflicts and ensuring collaboration (Premium Times, 2025). Federal laws could specify heavy penalties for politicizing or abusing any police formation.
• Federal Oversight and Unity: To maintain national unity, a mechanism can be put in place whereby the federal government licenses or supervises state police units to some degree. For instance, state police chiefs might be co-confirmed by a federal body, or the federal police (NPF) could have powers to take over a state police unit in extreme cases of misuse (akin to a federal takeover of a state government in emergencies). This layered command structure would reassure that state forces do not become rogue or separatist. At the same time, routine operations and control would remain at the state/local level for agility.
• Phased Implementation: Rather than rolling out 36 new police forces overnight, Nigeria could undertake a phased pilot program (Nigeria Risk index, 2025). High-risk states like those in the North-Central and North-West could establish state police first, under close monitoring, to test the concept. Lessons learned (on training, command, oversight, cooperation with federal units, etc.) would inform expansion to other states. This cautious approach allows refinement of the model and builds trust gradually. It aligns with suggestions that a pilot rollout in willing states could serve as a proof-of-concept while constitutional amendments are fine-tuned (Nigeria Risk index, 2025).
• Strengthening Community Policing: In tandem with any state police initiative, Nigeria should invest in formal community policing programs that bridge the gap between the public and law enforcement. This means training and integrating local vigilantes or neighborhood watch groups as a supplementary arm of either the state or federal police. They can function as unarmed community safety personnel or intelligence scouts. Proper training in human rights and conflict de-escalation should be given, and they should operate under a clear code of conduct and supervision. By professionalizing the vigilante outfits that are already popular, the country can harness their local knowledge while curbing excesses (Daily Trust, 2025).
• Accountability and Human Rights: A multi-layered policing architecture must include strong accountability mechanisms at every level. Independent oversight bodies (at state level for state police, and strengthened ones for federal police) should handle public complaints against the police. Civil society and the media in Plateau and elsewhere will have a role to play in spotlighting abuses and ensuring that the introduction of state police does not lead to a new wave of rights violations. By instituting checks — such as requiring court orders for certain actions, and involving local community boards in reviewing police conduct — the legitimate fears of political oppression can be mitigated. Crucially, all stakeholders must be part of the dialogue: not just governors and federal politicians, but also opposition parties, traditional rulers, community vigilante leaders, youth groups, and security experts. A more inclusive discourse would focus on practical problem-solving — how do we respond faster to an attack on a village? how do we ensure one ethnic group’s police don’t oppress another? what training and resources are needed at local level? — rather than on mistrust and power dynamics alone. By elevating the conversation to these concrete issues, the debate can shift from personalized opinions to evidence-based policymaking. For instance, if the concern is misuse by a governor, the debate should explore specific legal provisions to check that, rather than halting the entire idea. If the concern is capability, discuss funding models and inter-agency cooperation. There is space for a compromise solution where local policing is enhanced in a way that includes community input and federal safeguards, thus marrying the benefits of proximity with the assurances of oversight.
• READ MORE: More than Ever, Nigeria Needs State Police

And So What?

The state policing debate in Plateau State exemplifies a broader Nigerian challenge: how to reform security governance in a federal system plagued by insecurity and political mistrust. Representative Gagdi’s staunch opposition and Governor Mutfwang’s persistent advocacy highlight the two poles of the discussion – one anchored in fear of political abuse, the other in urgency of local security needs. Both perspectives carry weight, but framing the issue as an either-or choice fails to address the complexity of the problem. Grassroots citizens, those living with the daily reality of violence, have the most at stake and yet are the most underrepresented in the debate. Their message is simple: deliver peace and safety, and do it in a way that doesn’t create new problems.

To answer that call, Plateau State and Nigeria as a whole must embrace a more nuanced, multilayered approach to policing reform. This means moving beyond personal sentiments or party talking points and rigorously evaluating how a state police system could be structured to serve the people rather than politicians. It also means being honest about the current stop-gap measures: informal vigilantes may patch some holes, but without formal structure they are not a sustainable or fully accountable solution. A well-designed state policing system, implemented with care, could empower communities and improve security without descending into the abuses critics fear – but only if it comes with the requisite legal guardrails and civic engagement.

In the Plateau debate, it’s time to raise the level of engagement: let experts hash out oversight models, let community members voice their security needs, let all sides consider pilot projects and evidence from other regions. By injecting these layers of analysis, the conversation can shift away from mere personal opinion and toward a constructive blueprint. Ultimately, the goal should be a security arrangement that recognizes local realities and empowers the grassroots, while firmly upholding justice, equity, and rule of law across all levels. In charting this path, Plateau State could even become a model for others – proving that with inclusive dialogue and thoughtful design, Nigeria can reform its policing architecture to better protect its people without sacrificing democracy or unity.

Fwangmun Oscar Danladi is a researcher working in the area of religious identity, postcolonial and political imaginaries, with a focus on Middle Belt Nigeria and global political imaginaries. He is currently a PhD Student at the University of Iowa, Iowa City, USA.

He can be reached via : fwangmun-danladi@uiowa.edu